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ABSTRACT: Following Rescher’s (1977) conception of dialectics, I argue for the view that the
dialectical aspect of argumentation enables a “second order intersubjectivity”, to be understood in
terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons. This feature underlies that
most argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of
rational validation” (Rescher, 1977: xiii) which presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity.
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to give an account of the dialectical dimension of
argumentation in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for
reasons. I aim to show that this recursivity promotes what we may call a “second
order intersubjectivity”. In dealing with it, we will face that most argumentative
discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational
validation”, as Rescher (1977) suggested, which presupposes the possibility of
attaining objectivity.
Additionally, I would like to show that this dialectical dimension is present in
argumentation understood either as a justificatory or as a persuasive device, so as to
leave open the door for an integration of the logical and rhetorical dimensions of
argumentation too.
ARGUMENTATION AS A JUSTIFICATORY AND AS A PERSUASIVE DEVICE
The activity of arguing plays two basic roles, both fundamental to humans as rational
and social beings: on the one hand, argumentation is a tool for knowledge because it
is the way we justify our beliefs and claims; on the other hand, it is also a tool for
individuals interplay because it promotes persuasion. I think that both roles are
idiosyncratic of the activity of arguing, and consequently I take that an account of
argumentation is prima facie committed to deal with them and to make sense of the
way they relate to each other.
Nonetheless, the possibility of giving a unitary account of the persuasive and
the justificatory aspects of argumentation seems far from obvious. The traditional
theoretical view was mainly concerned with the semantics of argumentation, that is,
with arguments as abstract objects that endorse semantic properties, specially, validity
and truth. According to the traditional account, argumentation should be conceived,
above all, as a means to justify claims and beliefs, that is, as a means to achieve and
determine knowledge. Yet, as criticised by most argumentation theorists, the classical
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approach had to face inescapable difficulties in dealing not only with real
argumentation in natural language, but also with the normativity of argumentation as
an activity which is not only semantically, but also pragmatically constrained.
For its part, the pragmatic approach that at present characterizes
Argumentation Theory has tried to counterbalance the semantic hegemony by
stressing the fact that argumentation is, above all, certain sort of activity. This
perspective has underlined the pragmatic properties of argumentation, like the
constrains of communicative rationality respecting argumetative exchanges, or the
conditions for its success. In considering argumentation from a pragmatic point of
view, current approaches have dealt with argumentation as a form of human interplay,
focusing on its role and features as a means to coordinate actions and beliefs.
In principle, the instrumental rationality of argumentation as a means to
coordinate actions and beliefs seems to be dependent on its internal-inherent
rationality as a means to justify. But acknowledging this relationship between the
justificatory and the persuasive dimensions of argumentation does not necessarily
requires to take the persuasive force of particular acts of arguing as the output of their
justificatory force: as pointed out in Bermejo-Luque (2006), there are several ways in
which to determine that a piece of argumentation is a good one, i.e. that it supports or
justifies its conclusion, does not involve coming to believe that conclusion.
But certainly, the rationality of argumentation as a means to coordinate actions
and beliefs is dependent on its promoting agreement on what the case is, and this
ability finally depends on its being a good means to show that our claims and beliefs
are correct. Argumentation is, in general, a rational means for persuasion because
good argumentation is able to show that our claims or beliefs are correct. And that is
indeed a good way of generating agreement among beings like us, who tend to
involuntarily believe what they think is correct. Consequently, we can say that
argumentation promotes legitimacy in two senses: on the one hand, it legitimates our
acts of coming to believe when offered good reasons; on the other hand, it is also a
legitimate means of persuasion.
SECOND ORDER INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Yet, there are different means to coordinate beliefs and actions other than
argumentation: suggestion, coercion, seduction, etc. Surely, they all are necessary and
even instrumentally rational means for higher level coordination in complex societies
constituted by individuals which are not only rational, but also responsive beings in
general. Yet, argumentation is a particularly interesting form of persuasion because it
promotes what we may call a ‘second order intersubjectivity’.
First order intersubjectivity is intersubjectivity accomplished by
communication in general, but argumentation makes possible the communication of
reasoning. What is the difference?
Any information exchange is a form of interplay. But communication is an
intersubjective form of information exchange, as it involves standards of rationality
related to its being intentional. According to the traditional pragmatic account of
meaning, when a speaker utters a sentence in the appropriate conditions, she gets to
communicate her beliefs. By contrast, when she argues, she communicates not just her
beliefs, but also the reasons that she has for them. That is, by saying that p under the
appropriate conditions, others will attribute her the belief that p, while by arguing for
p, others will be in a position to consider her reasons to believe that p, being these
reasons not the mere explanation of her believing that p, but rather being reasons to
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show that p is true, acceptable or probable, and therefore, being reasons for whoever
to believe that p. So to speak, in argumentation, rationality is not only the input, but
also the output of the activity: by arguing, we make rational our beliefs to others. In
this sense, argumentation enables the coordination of beliefs and actions among
individuals by promoting agreement about what the case is.
Thus, the sort of agreement that argumentation enables is radically different
from any kind of pact, or the result of negotiations. Rather, it is the product of
generating conviction about what are the right or adequate things to do or to believe.
In distinguishing between agreement by conviction and agreement by pact or contract,
it is interesting to notice that, despite argumentation makes it possible the
coordination of both, beliefs and actions, this coordination is always brought about via
beliefs. That is, argumentation coordinates actions and beliefs by promoting
agreement about what the case is. This explains one of its principal features, namely,
that this sort of agreement cannot be forced. It is because argumentation promotes
agreement about what the case is –which, of course, includes what we “should”,
“need”, “shouldn’t”, “must”, “cannot”, etc ... do, etc.- that it cannot promote
agreement as a result of a negotiation: this agreement is not based on compromises,
but on beliefs. We can negotiate what to do, but we cannot negotiate what to believe
because, in principle, we do not decide on our beliefs: my belief that p is my thinking
that p is the case; we can only believe just as we think it is the case. Actually,
“believing that p” and “thinking that p is the case”, are prima facie the same thing. As
far as agreement by argumentation cannot be negotiated, it cannot be forced either.
That is the main reason why argumentation is, on the other hand, not just a legitimate,
but also a legitimating means of interaction among individuals.
Argumentation as a second order intersubjective activity enables a path for
improvement because of its recursivity. The normative output of the activity of
arguing, i.e. the justification of our beliefs and claims, involves second order
intersubjectivity because it requires regulated feedback rather than mere interplay
upon communication as a first order intersubjective activity. This regulated feedback
constitutes in fact further argumentation. When we try to justify a claim by offering a
reason, we might be required to firstly justify the reason, the warrant that would
license the step from this reason to that claim, or both. Additionally, when we aim to
persuade of a claim because of a reason, we may need to firstly persuade of our
reasons or to persuade of their relevance for our claim. At any step, further
argumentation may be advanced or required in order to justify our claim, or to
succeed in inducing the corresponding belief. In this sense, argumentative discourses’
recursivity expresses the way argumentation is able to test its own cogency, either as a
means to persuade or as a means to justify. Such is, in the present account, what I call
“the dialectical dimension of argumentation”.
COORDINATION VIA BELIEFS
R. Pinto (2001) has defended that we should broaden the concept of argumentation so
as to characterize it as “an attempt to modify conscious attitudes through rational
means” (2001: 10). In his view, it is a mistake to consider that argumentation only
aims at promoting certain sort of “doxastic” attitudes, namely, beliefs and belief-like
attitudes. We can also give reasons for adopting different kinds of attitudes towards
propositions other than doxastic ones. Thus, argumentation can be considered a means
to justify beliefs and claims, but also other types of doxastic attitudes like “suspecting
that p”, “being inclined to believe that p”, “considering that p”, etc; at inducing non-
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doxastic attitudes towards propositions, like “hoping that p”, “fearing that p”, etc; and
even at inducing conscious attitudes other than propositional ones, like “approving
something”, “disliking something”, etc. According to this, Pinto would refuse the idea
that argumentation always coordinates beliefs and actions via beliefs.
My first response to this position consists in pointing out that to be successful
in persuading a subject S of doing A does not necessarily imply that S actually does
A: think of a case in which S just cannot do A, though she tries to. If I want to
persuade you of hating John, I can succeed in persuading you of hating him without
achieving your actual hate. Thus, my success in persuading you of hating him would
consist in my success in inducing the belief that this person is to be hated. As Pinto
seems to acknowledge in recognizing at least that the intended effect of argumentation
is to promote “conscious attitudes”, if I manage to persuade you of x (for example,
“hating John”), x cannot pass “unnoticed” to you. But noticing something as awful,
lovely, sensible, etc. does not necessarily involve “moving our passions” in the
corresponding direction (“Yes, it’s awful; I shouldn’t do it, but I can´t help it!”). At its
best, it involves regarding, i.e. being conscious of, certain qualities in the intentional
object of our attitude. That is the difference between persuading of something and just
inducing an attitude: induced attitudes can be neither conscious nor intentional,
contentful attitudes, like certain feelings towards objects and situations. According to
my proposed account, to give reasons for an attitude, whether propositional or not,
and whether doxastic or not, would be to give reasons for a claim that the object of
our attitude has such and such characteristics, and to give reasons for doing A would
be to give reasons for a claim that A should, must, can, etc be done. Accordingly, to
justify an attitude would be to show that the corresponding claim is correct.
I think that an additional difficulty of Pinto’s conception would be to explain
in which sense argumentation could be distinguished from other discursive devices
with rhetorical power which are merely grounded on the addressees’ responsiveness
to different kinds of stimuli. After all, is it not “an attempt to modify conscious
attitudes by rational means” to induce fear on an addressee by raising a threat on her?
I think that there is at least one sense in which we can say that a threat is a rational
means to induce fear, just as we can say that it is rational to feel fear when threatened.
So, which sense of ‘rational means’ would be Pinto appealing to? Is it equivalent to
‘reasons’? But in that case, in which sense can we give reasons for an attitude? If this
attitude is something already held by someone, our reasons can only serve to manifest
its adequacy, morality, efficiency, etc; that is, they are reasons for the claim that this
attitude is adequate, fair, useful, etc. On the other hand, if the attitude is to be done,
our reasons must also be reasons for the claim that A should, must, can, etc. be done,
otherwise no appraisal of the suitability of these reasons would be available excepting
its actual efficiency in inducing someone to entertain such and such attitude. That is,
we would have no means to distinguish ‘reasons’ from mere ‘stimuli’, and
consequently, we would have no means to distinguish argumentation from other types
of discursive devices having rhetorical effects.
DIALECTICAL NORMATIVITY
So far, I have characterized the dialectical dimension of argumentation as a second
order activity. I have outlined the recursive character of this activity, both as an
attempt to show that a target claim is correct and as an attempt to induce beliefs. Let
me now continue by outlining the relationship between the dialectical dimension of
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argumentation, so understood, and the procedure that, since Socrates, is known as
dialectics.
First of all, following some of the ideas that N. Rescher presented in
Dialectics. A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (1977), I
would like to make a distinction between ‘Dialectic’ as a discipline, and ‘dialectics’ as
certain type of procedure. I think of Dialectic as an instrumental discipline devoted to
the improvement of dialectical abilities and to the appraisal of discourse as a
dialectical procedure. Aristotle’s Topics would be, mainly, a foundational work for
such a discipline, although the practice grounded on dialectical principles, i.e. what I
propose to name ‘dialectics’, is regarded as a Socratic invention.
The first thing to notice about Dialectic is its wholly prescriptive nature: the
discipline is constituted by rules prescribing the development of certain activity whose
goal, as Plato put it, is not persuasion but truth. But on the other hand, the activity
itself is constitutively determined by these rules, so that an activity failing to fulfil
dialectical rules is no more dialectics. That is why it would be senseless to talk about
good or bad dialectics. In this sense, rather, dialectical normativity would determine
whether or not certain activity is dialectical, and the features of any dialectical activity
should be elucidated by reference to these constitutive rules. Consequently, the
question of whether dialectical normativity could be considered as argumentative
normativity tout court is to be answered by considering whether good argumentation
and dialectics are the same type of activity after all. As we are going to see, good
argumentation cannot be reduced to dialectics, and for that reason, argumentative
normativity cannot be identified with dialectical normativity tout court.
To begin with, I must say that we should not ground a difference between
argumentation and dialectics by identifying dialectics with dialogue and, then,
pointing out that argumentation is not necessarily dialogical. The question of whether
argumentation is essentially dialogical or not has been already discussed in the recent
literature, mostly regarding the suitability of Pragma-dialectics as a normative theory
of Argumentation.
In “The Dialogue Model of Argument” (1998), Blair has argued that not every
piece of argumentation can be casted in a dialogical form. According to Blair, there
are forms of argumentation which are, characteristically, “non-enganged”. Such is the
case, for example, of argumentation carried out in defending a thesis in a book.
Despite the whole book can be conceived as a big communicative movement within a
wider exchange, in point of fact the writter is not really enganged with the
presuppositions, objections and alternative thesis of any particular party, so that she
sets herself free of addressing her argumentation to any particular audience. If a
communicative act is non-enganged, in this sense, then, according to Blair, it does not
count as a dialogue, but as a monologue –or two.
Whether or not we agree with the view that not every argumentation can be
interpreted as an exchange between two parties, we may be able to determine whether
or not dialectics is the same type of activity than dialogue. In my view, neither every
dialogue counts as a dialectical exchange -mainly because, as mentioned above, if we
fail to fulfil dialectical rules our activity is not dialectical at all, whether or not it was
dialogical- nor every dialectical exchange is dialogical: dialectical rules prescribe the
way certain type of theoretical inquiry must proceed. Consequently, whereas a
dialogue is certain form of communication essentially determined by the existence of
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two parties, dialectics is a method of inquiry that does not necessarily require of
parties 1 .
In my view, the main problem of identifying dialectics and dialogue is that
such conception has undermined the appreciation of argumentation both as dialectical
and rhetorical. The reason is that in most cases, there has been a tendency to
distinguish between dialectical and rhetorical activities as dialogical versus
monological speech acts, i.e. as communicative exchanges carried out by two parties
versus speeches directed to a rather passive audience, respectively. This assumption
has obscured a conception of the dialectical nature of argumentation in terms of its
recursivity, and of the rhetorical nature of argumentation in terms of its ability to
persuade.
DIALECTICAL RULES
So far, I have characterized a dialectical procedure as the activity of following
dialectical rules. Now, I would like to give an account of the dialectical dimension of
argumentation as the development of a dialectical procedure. So, which are its rules?
If an act of arguing is an act of putting forward a claim supported by a reason,
then dialectical procedures regarding acts of arguing will be the result of carrying out
three types of movements: 1) subjecting an assertion to a certain condition, i.e.
making a proviso, (“a, given that c”) 2) questioning the meeting of a condition, i.e.
suggesting a defeater, (“really c?”) and 3) questioning the bearing of a condition to
legitimately making certain assertion, i.e. suggesting a confutation (really if c, a?”).
The constitutive conditions and consequences of these movements would determine
the dialectical rules involved in argumentation. Thus, if a proviso is an assertion that
the meeting of condition c suffices for asserting a, then its main conditions are both
that c and that c actually suffices for legitimately asserting a. In accordance, its main
consequence is to establish that a can be put forward because c. Consequently,
dialectical rules respecting provisos would be: 1) “show that a given that c”, and 2) “if
a proviso is accepted, you can put forward that a, given that c”.
On the other hand, a defeater is a reservation on whether the condition of a
proviso is actually met. Its main condition is lacking reasons for accepting that
condition c has been actually met, and its main consequence is suspending our
acceptance that this condition has been met. Thus, dialectical rules respecting
defeaters would be: 3) “question whether condition c has been met”, and 4) “if
making a defeater is an acceptable move, i.e. if we do not have reasons to accept that
condition c has been met indeed, the supposition that it has been met, and its
consequences, are to be dismissed”.
Finally, a confutation is a reservation on whether condition c really entitles to
assert that a. Its main condition is lacking reasons for accepting that c is positively
relevant for a, and its main consequence is suspending our acceptance that whenever
condition c is met, a can be put forward. Thus, the dialectical rules for confutations
are: 5) “question whether c is positively relevant for a”, and 6) “if making a
confutation is an acceptable move, i.e. if we do not have reasons to accept that

1

Blair himself considers that despite not every argumentation is dialogical, every argumentation is
dialectical (1998: 338). That is, in his view, dialogue and dialectics would represent different categories
too.
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condition c is positively relevant for a indeed, the assumption that it is and its
consecuences, are to be dismissed”.
Notice that each of these moves can be carried out either by just one party or
by more than one. In the first, case, what we have is a researcher taking into account
possible reservations regarding the correction of her own assertions. Additionally, this
dialectical process can be carried out either as strong or weak opposition between
parties: whereas in strong opposition dialectics the assertions of each party are
incompatible, so that each party’s advance amounts to a backward on the other’s side,
in weak opposition dialectics, the opponent’s role is just to suggest rebuttals and
defeaters to the proponent’s assertions and provisos. In any case, according to this
account, it seems apparent that the dialectical development of argumentation is a
procedure that by itself cannot settle the question of the correction of our claims.
Rather, it would constitute a means for investigation.
At first sight, N. Rescher’s Dialectics. A Controversy-Oriented Approach to
the Theory of Knowledge seems to be an attempt at characterizing dialectics, mainly,
as dialogical argumentation. The sorts of movements that he recognizes in a
dialectical process are: categorical assertion, cautious assertion and provisoed
assertion, which are movements that seem to require of a proponent and an opponent.
Nonetheless, he admits that the rules determining a dialectical process, as he specifies
them, can shift from disputation, a dialogical process, to a methodology of inquiry, a
monological process (Rescher, 1977: 46). According to Rescher, this shift requires an
abrogation of merely conventional rules for dispute to “purely rational” rules for
inquiry. Nevertheless, as Rescher himself recognizes, “since this process is
intrinsically nonterminating (…), there must be some additional rules –extrinsic to the
dialectical process itself- for fixing a stopping point to the process” (1977: 19).
Therefore, he would also be admitting that dialectics, so conceived, is not really to be
identified with argumentation tout court, because it is not a means for claiming, but a
means for searching.
Nevertheless, it is possible to cast argumentation, at least in part, as a
dialectical procedure by taking each reason-claim unit as a proviso. In doing so, we
question the cogency of the corresponding argumentative act. On the other hand, as
far as reasons, either as a means to persuade or to justify a claim, can be questioned –
both respecting their truth-value and their positive relevance to a claim- any piece of
argumentation can incorporate reasons for undercutting possible reservations. Finally,
an argumentative dialogue can also be cast, at least in part, as a dialectical exchange
in which each party aims at advancing its viewpoints either by raising doubts on the
other’s, or by offering new arguments against the doubts raised by the other party.
ARGUMENTATION AS THE SEARCH AND REQUEST OF OBJECTIVITY
The dialectical nature of argumentation, its recursivity, implies that, in point of fact,
most argumentative discourses are the explicit part of a dynamic activity without a
predetermined end: new provisos, defeaters and confutations might await us at any
time, (unless the field of our inquiry is previously or independently settled –for
example, because of the existence of armoured claims stopping further questioning).
That would be the sense in which Rescher’s conception of dialectic as “a mechanism
of rational validation” (1977: xiii) is rather a means to underline the dialectical nature
of argumentation as an activity whose normative output is a decision on the correction
of our claims and beliefs: the very activity of appraising argumentation develops into
further argumentation. The activity of giving and asking for reasons often involves
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participants as evaluators. And in appraising argumentation we may need to
dialectically deepen in the act of arguing as stated. The dialectical nature of
argumentation is not only a matter of its being brought about as a dialectical
procedure by two parties, but also of the fact that, in order to determine the truthvalues that we should really ascribe to the propositions being the content of reasons
and warrants, the evaluators may need to produce further argumentation for them. In
case they cannot find positive reasons to determine these truth-values, they may need
to produce themselves possible defeaters for the reasons or confutations for the
warrants to show that they are incorrect.
If we cast an act of arguing as a dialectical procedure, defeaters would be
movements directed to question the acceptability of the reasons adduced. They may
constitute argumentation themselves, so that an evaluator should appraise them in
order to decide on the value of the target reason. For its part, a confutation is a
reservation on whether the condition of a proviso really entitles to make certain
assertion. In argumentation, confutations would be movements directed to question
the relevance of a reason for a claim, and, as in the case of defeaters, they may
constitute further argumentation to be appraised. This appraisal would result in an
ascription of a truth-value to the warrant of the original act of arguing.
Because of its recursive, dialectical nature, argumentations is, at its minimum,
an als ob activity regarding objectivity: people engaged in argumentative practices
behave as if it were possible to attain objective beliefs. The assumption that
objectivity is available is what makes sense of their confidence in achieving others’
persuasion by offering reasons: on the one hand, because good reasons are normative
respecting beliefs; and on the other hand, because the goodness of a reason is not a
matter of subjective acceptance: the recursivity of argumentation would vanish if
reasons were accepted or refused in the name of our beliefs, because at any step, an
actual belief, either of the arguer or of the addressee, would stop further inquiry, and
further attempt at persuading or justifying. Reasons and claims are stated in the name
of objectivity. Thus, objectivity is the spur of arguers’ activity –whether or not, in the
last resort, they are completely hopeless. Additionally, there is no other means to test
the objectivity of our beliefs than trying to show them to be correct, that is, to justify
them. And this is, essentially, to argue.
Consequently, in regarding the dialectical nature of argumentation as the
search and request for objectivity, we will have to be clear that, when determining the
degree of support that an argumentative discourse is able to confer on its claim, we
are actually valuing the stated part of an open process.
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